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THE CRISIS OF THE CRISIS OF CAPITALISM 




Synopsis: Where is the coveted, prophesied, dreaded crisis of capitalism? Why has the 
economic and social turmoil that recently afflicted Western democracies triggered such faint 
attempts to replace the apparently moribund socio-economic model? The alleged crisis of 
capitalism, I claim, has been a catalyst in the metamorphosis of neoliberal capitalism Ð a 
transmutation that began well before the recent economic meltdown and in many ways 
triggered it. This has led to the emergence of a fourth historical modality of capitalism, which I 
call Ôaggregative capitalismÕ (after the entrepreneurial nineteenth-century capitalism, the 
ÔorganizedÕ capitalism of the post-WWII welfare state, and the neoliberal, ÔdisorganizedÕ 
capitalism of the late twentieth century). In this essay, I trace the features of this new form of 




I have profited from the feedback of colleagues who attended my talks at LSE on 4 Nov. 2014 
(co-hosted by the European Institute, IR and Government Department) and at UC Berkeley on 








This is a work-in-progress. Comments are welcome at: A.Azmanova@kent.ac.uk 
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ÒQ. What is the shortest story? 
  A. Socialism. 
 Q. WhatÕs the longest story? 
 A. The crisis of capitalism.  
A popular joke from my childhood in then 
communist Bulgaria (Albena Azmanova)  
 
 
1. Capitalism on its deathbed: two paradoxes 
We have let a splendid crisis go to waste, as the disaffection with capitalism grew broader and 
reached briefly a boiling point in 2010 and 2011. ÒA deftly timed call for the overthrow of 
capitalismÓ: this is how the Financial Times newspaper commented on David HarveyÕs book 
The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism in the spring of 2010.  ÒIf this is not a 
revolutionary moment,Ó the review stated, Òwhat would be?Ó  Forget about the angry streets Ð 
the Occupy movements, the Indignados in Spain, the enraged Greeks; it was the very 
intellectual bastion of capitalism that portended its downfall in the midst of the global financial 
meltdown.1 
Capitalism is of course always in some sort of trouble Ð crises are essential to its 
reproduction, as both Marx and Schumpeter would remind us. But what the recent economic 
turbulence has stirred up are pronouncements about the terminal crisis of capitalism, capitalism 
on its deathbed. It is beyond doubt that capitalism is in serious trouble, as the banking crisis of 
2008 turned into crisis of public finances, a crisis of the real economy and, eventually, through 
rising unemployment Ð into a social crisis. At the onset of 2015, the economic engine of 
capitalism is still in some difficulty and there is a general sense that something is amiss.  Even as 
the economy is recovering, society is not: for most people the recovery is experienced as a 
depression. Moreover, as David Harvey has again reminded us in his latest book, capitalism 
seems ever harder at work digging its own grave as some of its less creative contradictions Ð its 
drive, for instance, to accumulate capital beyond the means of investing it, its penchant for 
using the cheapest methods of production thus creating consumers with no means of 
consumption, and its compulsion to exploit nature to the point of extinction Ð all seem to point 
to its doom.2  In an analysis that is as readable and compelling as MarxÕs Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte (per HabermasÕs observation), Wolfgang Streeck has recently argued that 
democratic capitalism cannot do more than delay its terminal crisis, as governments are buying 
time via palliative policies creating the illusion of wealth.3 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 In early 2012, the Financial Times ran a ÒCapitalism in CrisisÓ series on its pages.   
2
 David Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism, London: Profile Books, 2014.  
3 That was done through generating inflation, accumulating public debt and fashioning incentives for private 
debt. Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism, Verso: London and New York, 2014 
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 CapitalismÕs prospects have rarely seemed gloomier. And yet, as we admit this, we are 
confronted with two paradoxes. The first one is this: there has been a general agreement, in 
policy and academic circles, that the recent economic crisis has been caused by the neoliberal 
policies of deregulation of financial, product and labor markets which have engendered 
economic and social risk of unmanageable magnitude. And yet, with a slight variation in the 
U.S. and Europe, the remedy administered for the illness is the one that caused it: a continuation 
and even deepening of neoliberal, supply-side and monetarist measures that impose austerity as 
the road to economic recovery. Significantly, in contrast to the situation of a century ago, 
missing is now a broad, cross-ideological coalition of forces mobilizing to protect society from 
the disembedded market, in the style of the counter-movement against free markets that Karl 
Polanyi had observed to take shape in the early twentieth century.4 At the time, European 
Conservatism and Socialism came to a consensus on the need to constrain markets -- a 
consensus enabling the construction of the post-war social capitalism and the welfare state.  
Instead, we now have governments, irrespective of their ideological allegiance, running to the 
rescue of financial capital and big business, and implementing austerity programs to reassure 
capital markets -- at the social cost of growing poverty and insecurity. 
 The second paradox is this: society is in agony, and yet it is bearing its pains with 
astonishing equanimity. The stock markets are now doing well, the people are not, and yet, 
apart from some sporadic outrage, there is a general tacit acceptance of the situation.  Despite 
the global eruption of popular protest (which originated with the Occupy Wall Street movement 
in September 2011 in New York and focused on issues of inequality and austerity), the 
legitimacy of the system of democratic capitalism is hardly in crisis. As one famous slogan of the 
Spanish Indignados proclaimed, ÓWe are not against the system, the system is against usÓ 
(basically, we want more inclusive capitalism, not its downfall).5  The very protests contain signs 
of the enduring legitimacy of capitalism as institutionalized socio-economic order, even as it 
malfunctions as an economic engine of prosperity.  
 Ample evidence for the missing legitimation crisis of capitalism has been supplied at the 
voting boot. If democratic elections are any indicator of prevailing preferences in our societies 
(and they surely are a better indicator than street protests), the rounds of elections held in the 
mature democracies of Europe at the nadir of the crisis suggests that neoliberal capitalism has 
considerable popular support, as the majority vote went persistently to the economically liberal 
center-right parties advocating the very economic model that caused the meltdown of 2008-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(first published in German by Suhrkamp Verlag in 2013).  Streek calls these policies Ômakeshifts alloing democratic 
politics to sustain the appearance of capitalism that delivered growth, with equal material advances for all, or even a 
gradual redistribution from top to bottom of market and life chances.Ó - at p. 165.  
4 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation [1944]. Boston: Beacon Press, 1957. 
 
5 
This is a far cry from the anti-conformist slogans of the student and worker revolts in General Charles de 
Gaulle's economically booming 1960s France: ÒBe realistic, ask for the impossibleÓ, ÒRun, comrade, the old world is 
behind youÓ ("Soyez raliste, demandez l'impossible", ÒCours camarade, le vieux monde est derrire toi"). 
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2011; parties of the Left (like the French socialists) have come to adopt neoliberal economic 
policy without penalty by the voters.6  Yet, social surveys indicate that a growing number of 
people, across the capital-labor divide, are frustrated with the intensified performance pressures 
and employment uncertainty the so called Òstructural adjustmentÓ neoliberal policies have 
generated, and declare that they would prefer a much better work-life balance, including 
discretionary time beyond the work-family balance, thus indicating a desire for autonomy from 
the productivist pressures of both the workplace and the family.7 This combines with 
unprecedentedly broad awareness that the way we produce and live our lives is toxic for the 
environment and increases the risks of life-threatening natural disasters. Rather than triggering 
an upheaval against the system of globally integrated capitalism, social frustration is, instead, 
being channeled into xenophobia (i.e. the phenomenal rise of electoral support to populist, anti-
immigrant and anti-EU fringe parties), and economic xenophobia has entered the political 
mainstream (a move illustrated by GordonÕs BrownÕs unapologetic slogan ÒBritish jobs for 
British workersÓ)8. How come?  
 As David Harvey has put it, Òthe performance of capitalism over the last 200 years has 
been nothing short of astonishingly creativeÓ.9  In what follows, I will claim that capitalism has 
been particularly creative in generating support for itself at the lowest point of its performance. 
How to explain this?  While we have been busy debating the crisis of capitalism, I will assert, 
capitalism has metamorphosed itself into a new form, which I will describe in some detail, 
setting it apart from its predecessor Ð the neoliberal configuration of the late 20th century. The 
most recent economic crisis has helped consolidate this transformation, but it certainly did not 
trigger it. I propose that, instead of pondering the crisis of capitalism, we account for 
capitalismÕs renewed consolidation, focusing critique on the way this consolidation has 
engendered new forms of injustice and domination. Thus, to understand why our societies are 
not making an effort to protect themselves, we need to understand the nature of this new, post-
neoliberal capitalism, which I have named aggregative capitalism10 (because of the particular 
way risks and opportunities are allocated, as I shall explain later on). The novel features of the 
new modality of capitalism concern three aspects of the socio-economic order: (a) the 
organization of the political economy (state-market relations), (b) the legitimation of political 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Elections in 2010 and 2011 brought to power the center-right in Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Finland, 
Andorra, Ireland, Italy, Denmark, Britain, and the Netherlands Ð to consider only the ÔmatureÕ democracies of Europe. In 
that period the majority of the vote went to the center-left only in Sweden, where the Social Democrats scored only 0,6 
percentage points higher than the economically liberal Moderate Rally Party (the vote for the former dropped with 4 
percentage points since the last election, while the vote for the latter rose with 4 percentage points). 
7 See my survey of data on this phenomenon in A. Azmanova ÒDe-gendering social justice in the 21st 
century: An immanent critique of neoliberal capitalismÓ, European Journal of Social Theory 15/2 (May 2012): 143-156, 
at p. 150 and A. Azmanova, ÒSocial Justice and Varieties of Capitalism: An Immanent CritiqueÓ,  New Political Economy 
17/4 (Sept. 2012): 445-463, at pp. 455-6. 
8 Gordon Brown, then leader of the U.KÕs Labour Party, made a speech promising "British Jobs for British 
workers" on 5 June 2007, shortly before taking the post of Prime Minister; he reiterated that promise at the Labour 
Party's annual conference in September that year, which caused controversy as he coupled this with a commitment to 
crack down on migrant workers. The Conservative Party, led by David Cameron promptly objected that such a 
commitment was illegal under EU law, and yet later claimed Mr Brown had copied the slogan from him.  
9 David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital: and the Crises of Capitalism, Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 46.  
10 I welcome proposals for a more befitting label.  
!! 5!
power within the semantics of a new social contract between public authority and citizens, and 
(c) the type of power public authority is entitled to exercise. Before I proceed to adumbrate the 
contours of this new modality of democratic capitalism, let me expose briefly the matrix of 
conceptualization that shapes my thinking about these transformative dynamics.  
 
2. The ÔrepertoireÕ of capitalism  
First a word on my treatment of democratic capitalism as a ÔsystemÕ. By ÔsystemÕ I mean the 
pattern of institutionalized social relations maintained by everyday social practices and the 
policies that regulate them. I do not hold that there is an objective system and all valid 
conceptualization of social phenomena should take this into account -- that is, I pledge no 
elegance to systems theory that is to guide all analyses. For the current explanatory purposes, 
however, it is useful to think of the current socio-political conundrum in terms of system, for no 
other reason than the fact that democratic capitalism exhibits the symptoms of a system with its 
operative logics Ð the competitive generation of profit and the competitive acquisition of 
political office.  This system is socially engineered and can be undone.  
Capitalism is a socio-economic system in flux, as John Maynard Keynes has put it, Òit is 
by nature a form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be 
stationaryÓ.11 From its inception, capitalism as a particular socio-economic order (rather than 
just a mechanism of economic production) has undergone a linear, diachronic, transformation -- 
from its initial, liberal (entrepreneurial) modality that was consolidated in the early nineteenth 
century, to its current state.  I do not propose to see these diachronic modalities as distinct 
ÔepochsÕ but rather as overlapping blueprints, reconfigurations of a repertoire in which every 
new form sublimates the preceding ones. 
 In describing the repertoire of capitalism I follow a path closer to Max Weber, rather 
than Karl Marx. Thus, I take the ÔrepertoireÕ of capitalism to be composed of its operative logic -- 
the competitive pursuit of profit by means of continuous, rational enterprise, together with its 
ethos12 - a set of worldviews orienting behaviour and giving it the meaning of rational enterprise 
under individual initiative. This repertoire emerged as early as the seventeenth century in 
Europe, within varied institutional frameworks  -- from those of monarchical absolutism to the 
free merchant Hansa towns, and consolidated as a distinct socio-economic order in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11
 John Maynard Keynes, ÒEconomic Possibilities for our Grand childrenÓ, fist published in two parts in in The 
Nation and Athenaeum 48/2&3 (October 11 &18, 1930).  
 
12 Max Weber defines ethos in terms of ethical ideals of duty having important formative influences on 
conduct; in this sense he talks about the ethos, or the Ôeconomic spiritÕ, of an economic system. (Max Weber, The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism [1930], trasl. Talcott Parsons. London and New York: Routledge, 1992; p. 27 
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nineteenth century. The process of consolidation, as Karl Polanyi reminds us, took place within 
the institutional framework of the liberal state Ð itself a creation of the self-regulating market.13 
How is the connection between, on the one hand, economic action14 and on the other, 
a political-institutional framework Ð a connection that engenders the particular symbiosis 
between capitalism as a system of social relations and the modern democratic liberal state Ð 
ensured? This connection is provided by a matrix of shared norms shaping the legitimacy 
relationship between public authority and citizens. This relationship is, in turn, articulated in the 
form of what Claus Offe has called Ôthe legitimate and legitimacy-conferring functions of the 
state.Õ15 These are functions (e.g. protection of private property, defence of territorial integrity, 
safeguarding order) that citizens expect from public authority, and therefore condition their 
obedience on the effective exercise of such functions. It is important to note three things about 
this legitimacy matrix. 
  First: what are deemed to be legitimate functions of the state are neither simply 
embodiments of interests nor of functional needs of the system. The functions of public authority 
are articulated within a symbolic fabric of perceptions within which they are socially 
constructed as being Ôlegitimate and legitimacy conferringÕ.  These legitimating perceptions are 
akin to ideology understood as mental representations specific to a given era Ð Ôa set of shared 
beliefs, inscribed in institutions, bound up with actions, and hence anchored in realityÕ.16 
  Second: The legitimacy matrix determines the thematic scope of the agenda of public 
debate: which social practices get politicized and thus become an object of contestation and 
which ones are accepted as a matter of course and therefore remain unchallenged. This is a 
crucial point in my conceptualisation of the missing crisis of capitalism Ð to the extent that 
social suffering is not politicised, there is no legitimation crisis of the socio-economic and 
political order. It is here that I depart significantly from the Frankfurt SchoolÕs take on the 
legitimation crisis of capitalism Ð approach that rests on two fundamental (and therefore 
unsubstantiated) assumptions. The first assumption is that there exists a clear-cut divide 
between, on the one hand, the systems of economic production and political administration, 
and on the other, the lifeworld of our social existence Ð two distinct dimensions of our 
collective existence that contain incompatible action orientations: respectively, towards success 
and towards mutual understanding.17 The second assumption is that systemsÕ legitimacy is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation. 
14 By economic action I mean the activities people undertake in the social (re)production of their life, writ 
large. Thus, Ôeconomic actionÕ (even when it is not remunerated) has a definitely productivist connotation, and one that 
has to do with the distribution of life-chances in society. Thus, when my 10-year old daughter sings to herself while 
doing her math homework, her singing does not count as economic action but her doing the math homework does.  
15 This concerns Ôthe state capacity to manage and distribute societal resources in ways that contribute to the 
achievement of prevailing notions of justiceÕ (C. Offe, Disorganised Capitalism, ed. by John Keane. Cambridge, Mass: 
MIT Press, 1985; p. 5). 
16 L. Boltanski and E. Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism [1999]. London and New York: Verso, 2005; p. 
3. 
17 For the most explicit exegesis of this position see Jrgen HabermasÕs Theory of Communicative Action 
(1981). 
!! 7!
something set, a constant that varies only quantitatively (ergo, we can speak of degrees of 
legitimacy) Ð that is, there is a limit to the penetration of the instrumental rationality of the 
economic and political systems of democratic capitalism into the lifeworld, beyond which 
problems of social integration ensue, and the systems are wrecked by legitimation crisis.18 
Even as I endorse this position as a normative ideal (that is, the notion of a lifeworld free 
of instrumental rationality oriented towards success is a good thing to strive for), I cannot 
endorse it as a reliable tool of analysis. As Kant has warned us in his political writings, 
normative ideals are out of place in analysis of political reality for one excellent reason: 
assumptions about the cognitive and moral capacities of individuals are an unreliable tool of 
analysis19 (i.e., if we were all equipped with sound cognition and morality, issues of justice will 
not even occur).  
I therefore prefer to approach the dynamics of social existence through the lens of what 
Pierre Bourdieu has called Ôeconomy of practicesÕ Ð a multiplicity of mundane social 
interactions that form a continuum of shared practices all invariably imbued with power and 
containing their own, ever shifting, action-orientations.20 This renders the notion of legitimation 
a matter of endogenous valorization (from within these very practices)21 and an entity in flux: 
what social phenomena get articulated as features of an acceptable and desirable socio-
economic and political order is entirely a matter of these phenomenaÕs politicisation as features 
produced and maintained through whatever happen to be the legitimate mechanisms of 
political rule Ð in other words, that these features are seen as political deliverables. The implicit 
understanding among citizens, and between citizens and public authority, about what are to be 
considered desirable and feasible things public authority should do for society alter, and this 
alteration frames the process of the politicization of social grievances. It is in this alteration, or 
metamorphosis, that we find the key to the two paradoxes of the missing crisis of capitalism.  
And finally, a word on the trajectories along which experiences of social injustice (as 
triggers of the de-legitimation of the socio-political system) emerge. Critical theory inherited 
from Marx and Lukcs a critique of power that ran along two inter-connected, but analytically 
distinct dimensions, which I name ÔrelationalÕ and ÔsystemicÕ dimensions of domination. 
Relational domination concerns the uneven distribution of life-chances within a model of well 
being, thus entailing the domination of some human beings by others. Injustice here stands in 
terms of power asymmetries triggering inequalities and exclusion; its remedy would necessitate 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 This enables authors of Frankfurt School intellectual pedigree to speak about legitimation crisis of 
capitalism, be it delayed. See Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis [1973], Boston: Beacon Press, 1975; and more 
recently Wolfgang StreekÕs: Buying Time (2014).  
19 Emmanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" (1795) 
20 Pierre Bourdieu, ÒThe forms of capitalÓ, in J. Richardson (Ed.) Handbook of Theory and Research for the 
Sociology of Education, New York: Greenwood, 1986, pp.241-258. 
21 This is quite in line with the notion of Ôimmanent critiqueÕ formulated by the first generation of Frankfurt 
School authors, which gets abandoned by Habermas as he undertakes to make a transcendental turn in critical theory 
via his discourse ethics. I discuss this turn in some detail in A. Azmanova, The Scandal of Reason: A Critical Theory of 
Political Judgment, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012; Ch. 2.   
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equalization of power relations and inclusion. Systemic domination concerns the constitutive 
features of the model of wellbeing within which life-chances are distributed. Here injustice 
emerges in terms of individualsÕ subjection to the functional imperatives of the socio-political 
system; its remedy would necessitate a radical change of the Ôrules of the gameÕ in the case at 
hand -- an overthrow of the system of democratic capitalism, rather than just making it more 
egalitarian and inclusive.22 
 
3. The three modalities of democratic capitalism 
Let me now review briefly the three well-known modalities of capitalism paying special 
attention to the legitimacy matrix that supports them. This will help me articulate, in the next 
section, the peculiarities of what I claim to be a novel modality of capitalism, born at the dawn 
of the 21st century. My analysis draws on empirical evidence from the European mature 
democracies and to some extend the United States; it makes no claim to be applicable to other 
geographical areas (such as Latin America or Eastern Europe).  
 
Liberal (entrepreneurial) capitalism 
The first modality of capitalism, the nineteenth century entrepreneurial form, developed within a 
unique political framework Ð that of the liberal constitutional state committed to ensuring 
institutional autonomy for the individual (constrained, of course, by labor commodification). 
This institutional autonomy was the foundation for the freedom of economic enterprise (laissez-
faire) via the freedom of contract vested in law.23 The emergence of the legal system of the 
modern liberal state cannot be simply attributed to capitalistic interests, although such interests, 
as Weber writes, have Ôundoubtedly also helped, but by no means alone and nor even 
principallyÕ.24 The form of capitalism that Weber deemed to be unique for the modern West -- 
the rational capitalistic organization of (formally) free labour25, is correlated to the institutional 
set-up of liberal constitutionalism via a particular mind-set Weber calls ÔOccidental rationalismÕ 
Ð Ôthe ability and disposition of men to adopt certain types of practical rational conductÕ.26 
Worldviews valorising (and motivating) rational enterprise under individual initiative are a key 
component of this mind-set. Thus, the enterprising spirit, in this first modality of capitalism, was 
not simply a norm governing the realm of economic action. It was rather a spiritual mind-set, a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22!For a more detailed exposition of my distinction between systemic and relational dimensions of domination 
in A. Azmanova, ÒCrisis? Capitalism is Doing Very Well. How is Critical Theory?Ó, Constellations 21/ 3 (2014), pp. 351-
365, at p. 353.  
23 The freedom of contract in time generated the economic constraints to the institutional autonomy of the 
individual, constraints known as labour commodification. 
24 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, p. 25. 
25 Ibid., p. 21. 
26 Ibid., p. 26. 
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Zeitgeist, and as such it assumed the status of Ôthe organizing principle of a society engaged in 
creating a market systemÕ27.   
 The nominal separation between economics and politics that is a constitutive feature of 
the liberal state, together with its typical institutional paraphernalia (e.g., the separation of 
powers, the legal safeguards against unlawful interference with the rights of privacy and 
property) thus provided the political setting for entrepreneurial capitalism; it became Ôthe 
irrefragable condition of the existing system of societyÕ.28 In this first modality of Occidental 
capitalism, the correlation between risk and opportunity (rewarding entrepreneurial risk with 
affluence) is established as one of the key legitimating resources of capitalism, and maintaining 
that correlation is among the liberal stateÕs key legitimacy-conferring functions Ð namely, to 
enact and safeguard the free market where competition among actors makes sure that risks 
actors undertake are correspondingly rewarded with opportunities for financial gains.  
 
a) social (organized) capitalism 
After WWII, nineteenth-century entrepreneurial capitalism was replaced by a new modality Ð 
what Scott Lash and John Urry (1987) named Ôorganised capitalismÕ.29 This second enunciation 
of the repertoire of capitalism developed within the institutional format of the welfare state.  The 
catalyst for the birth of the second modality of capitalism was the broad societal movement 
against the economic dogma of the self-regulating market Ð a movement that emerged already at 
the waning of the nineteenth century. The self-regulating market had effectively triggered a 
legitimacy crisis of the system: as it had engendered grave social risks for those with little 
opportunity for financial gains from those risks (i.e. wage labour), the self-regulating market had 
violated the fundamental legitimacy-conferring principle of capitalism: that risks and 
opportunities should be correlated.  
The collectivist countermovement, Polanyi notes, was a broad societal endeavour, 
which Ôwas not due to any preference for socialism or nationalism on the part of concerted 
interests, but exclusively to the broader range of the vital social interests affected by the 
expanding market mechanism.Õ30 This consensus was brought about not by the threat the market 
economy represented to the interests of a particular social group, but because the market, 
disembedded from society, Ôbecame a threat to the human and natural components of the social 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p.135. At the dawn of the nineteenth century, Wilhelm von 
Humboldt gave expression to this entrepreneurial Zeitgeist, when, writing against the interventionist, ÔpositiveÕ state, he 
exclaimed: ÔBut what human beings are after, and should be after, is diversity and activityÉ. surely we human beings 
have not sunk so low that we actually prefer welfare and happiness to greatness for ourselves, as individuals.Õ (Wilhelm 
von Humboldt, ÔIdeas for a Proposed definition of the Limits and the Legality of the StateÕ (1792), in D. Sidorsky, ed. The 
Liberal Tradition in European Thought. New York: G.P. PutnamÕs Sons, 1970; p.72) 
28 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p. 225. 
29 S. Lash and J. Urry, The End of Organized Capitalism. Oxford: Polity Press, 1987. 
30 Ibid., p.145. 
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fabricÕ.31 The matrix of state-society relations thus came to be rebuilt on broadly shared 
worldviews converging on the novel, for the early twentieth century, value of social rights 
whose raison dÕtre is the protection of society from the market (and thus bringing into balance 
the risk-opportunity dynamics). Moreover, as citizenship came to incorporate the social right to 
a decent standard of living, the normative scope of the legitimacy of modern democracies thus 
expanded to include the concept of social justice (i.e. the equitable distribution of social risk), 
alongside the political and civil liberties and the value of economic entrepreneurship that had 
been political cornerstones of the liberal constitutional state. The legitimacy matrix came to 
include a redistributive function of the state, and more broadly the social responsibility of public 
authority (understood as the duty of public authority to take into account the broader social 
consequences of the economic processes endorsed by public policy). The social partnership 
among organised capital, organised labour, and a democratic state that marked this new socio-
political constellation was institutionalized in a variety of models of democratic capitalism -- 
captured in the Ôvarieties of capitalismÕ and Ôvarieties of welfare regimesÕ literature.32 
 
b) neoliberal (disorganized) capitalism 
Since the nineteen seventies, ÔorganizedÕ (social) capitalism came to be subjected to policy 
pressures for economic liberalization via further privatisation of ownership and deregulation of 
financial, product, and labour markets for the sake of enhancing market efficiency. These 
transformative dynamics have been broadly described as Ôdis-organizationÕ of capitalism -- a 
breakdown of the mechanisms that had previously ensured, through mediation, a dynamic 
balance between social power and political authority, Ôa trend in the political economy away 
from centralized authoritative coordination and control towards dispersed competition, 
individual instead of collective action, and spontaneous, market-like aggregation of preferences 
and decisionsÕ.33 Eventually, the hierarchical Fordist work structure that had been predominant 
in the period of Ôorganized capitalism,Õ was dissolved into a new, flexible, network-based form 
of organization.34 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Ibid., p.150. Polanyi goes to great lengths to emphasise that the countermovement against the free market 
was not driven by particular interests or a given ideological agenda: ÔPrecisely because not the economic but the social 
interests of different cross sections of the population were threatened by the market, persons belonging to various 
economic strata unconsciously joined forces to meet the dangerÕ (Ibid, pp.154-155). 
32 The first taxonomy captures variation in the degree to which the political economy is coordinated Ð as 
already noted, here variation typically extends from Ôliberal market economiesÕ to Ôcoordinated market economiesÕ. (See 
P. Hall and D. Soskise, eds. Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). The second taxonomy, introduced by Gosta Esping-Andersen, captures variation in the 
nature and generosity of social benefits provision. Within it, national varieties are clustered into Ôliberal,Õ Ôconservative,Õ 
and Ôsocial-democraticÕ types of welfare regimes. (G. Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
33 W. Streeck, Re-Forming Capitalism. Institutional Change in the German Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009; p. 149. 
34 I am not aware of a better documented analysis of this process than Boltanski and ChiapelloÕs The New 
Spirit of Capitalism. 
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The fact that the state reduced the share of public ownership of the economy and 
minimized its redistributive functions does not mean that the state reverted to its minimalist 
format from the times of entrepreneurial capitalism: the hefty administrative apparatus amassed 
under the welfare state is simply deployed differently. Public authority does not keep its distance 
from society Ð it takes the format of what Giandomenico Majone has described as the 
Ôregulatory stateÕ Ð a state that gives priority to the use of legal authority and regulation over 
other tools of stabilization and redistribution.35 A peculiarity of this style of regulation is that it is 
not directed towards social groups but towards individuals and fosters individual 
responsibilization. What the French call lÕtat social actif (a term coined in the mid 1990s, to 
mark the difference from the redistributive tat-providence) thus in fact transfers responsibilities 
for wellbeing from public authority to citizens. For instance, the landmark policies of labor-
market activation amount to the stateÕs providing skills-training rather than creating jobs Ð which 
leaves individuals responsible for both their employability and for finding a job.  
The legitimacy matrix in this third enunciation of the capitalist repertoire is shaped by 
what Boltanski and Chiapello called Ônew spirit of capitalismÕ  Ð not so much the 
entrepreneurial individualism that anchored the first modality, but an ethos that celebrates more 
largely initiative, creativity, and autonomy, co-opting the libertarian currents of the late 1960s 
for the purposes of endless capital accumulation.  
 
4. The fourth modality: ÔaggregativeÕ capitalism 
Already before the current economic crisis, capitalism had begun its transformation into a new 
modality, which I have initially described as Ôreorganized capitalismÕ36, to set it apart from the 
previous, neoliberal form that Offe, Lash and Urry had named Ôdisorganized capitalismÕ. I do 
not see this new modality as a perfectly distinct form from the neolibral one, but there are 
important tendencies and dominant features that have been altered. ÔReorganized capitalismÕ 
preserved many of the features of the neoliberal form that preceded it, just as Ôdisorganized 
capitalismÕ in its turn had preserved many of the features of the welfare state it dismantled. I will 
now first discuss some of the structural dynamics activating this new form of capitalism before I 
zoom in on the new legitimacy matrix seeking an explanation for the missing legitimation crisis.  
 
a) The structural dynamics of contemporary capitalism 
Late modernity is marked not simply by the proliferation of risk, as Ulrich Bech has claimed,37 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 G. Majone, G. Deregulation or Re-regulation? Regulatory Reform in Europe and the United States. London: 
Francis Pinter, 1990. 
36 A. Azmanova, ÒCapitalism Reorganized: Social Justice after Neo-liberalismÓ, Constellations: An 
International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory 17/3 (2010), pp.390-406. 
37
 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society, Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications, 1992. 
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but also by the proliferation of opportunity, while the distribution of both risk and opportunity 
has become strongly stratified, with the state shifting its role from countering social stratification 
(via compensatory social protection) to fostering it. Let me trace the logic of this shift more 
carefully.  
 The starting point of this movement is the redefinition of state-market relations at the 
close of the twentieth century.  The structural imperative of capital accumulation on a global 
scale, via integrated domestic markets, became translated into a policy imperative for increased 
global competitiveness of national economies. The policy agenda came to be centered not 
simply on enhancing market efficiency in order to increase growth (as in the formula of 
neoliberal capitalism of the 1980s and 1990s), but on achieving increased competitiveness in 
the global economy. Growth became increasingly predicated on competitiveness.  Democratic 
governments across the left-right political spectrum undertook liberalization and deregulation of 
the economy as part of national strategies for international competitiveness.38 This shift has been 
explicit in the EU policy agenda since the turn of the century, as the stress on global 
competitiveness has become more acute in the transition from the Lisbon Strategy of 200039 to 
its revised version of 2006, and the current Agenda 2020. The objective of global 
competitiveness has generated a trans-ideological policy consensus, embraced by capital and 
labour, and enforced by public authority both at the level of European Union institutions as well 
as at the level of member-states. Tellingly, even trade-union activity has changed its nature, as 
labour-market liberalization, accepted under the threat of losing jobs, became a central object 
of agreement. Within this new corporatism, access to the labour market (obtaining and keeping 
a job) is the key element around which the post-WWII agreement on social rights is being 
reconfigured. Thus, notions of social justice have shifted from the original concerns with decent 
working conditions and standards of living towards preoccupations with oneÕs employability 
and capacity to retain a job Ð a shift from ÔsecurityÕ to ÔresilienceÕ.   
The structural roots of social injustice in this context have to do with a type of political 
economy that engenders not so much inequality but a generalized economic uncertainty via the 
maximization of opportunities for wealth creation in a context of open borders and reduced 
social safety net. This is an uncertainty to which almost all participants are subjected. It is this 
uncertainty, experienced as a potential threat to livelihoods and lifestyles, that is entailing 
deepened and widened labor commodification Ð a process that affects both labor-market 
insiders and labor-market outsides, both the poor and the affluent Ð regardless of our societiesÕ 
unprecedented capacities for exit from the process of economic production (labor de-
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38 For a wealth of empirical evidence on this see D. Rueda, Social Democracy Inside Out: Partisanship and 
Labour-Market Policy in Industrialised Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
39 In this document, heads of governments of EU member-states pledged to make the EU, by 2010, Ôthe most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the worldÕ (The Lisbon Special European Council, ÒTowards a 
Europe of Innovation and KnowledgeÓ, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, March 2000). Available from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm 
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commodification). This occurs despite the fact that increasing number of people declare leisure 
(and not just work-family balance) to be a desired good. The key structural contradiction of 
contemporary capitalism, therefore, concerns the tension between the great de-commodification 
capacities of our societies and the equally great commodification pressures to which all 
participants are subjected. This suggests that the engine of systemic domination is the 
universalization of commodification pressures that had previously affected exclusively blue-
collar workers. 
In this sense, the growing impoverishment, inequality, and hostility to foreigners that 
advanced liberal democracies have seen in recent years are symptoms, but not causes, of the 
social malaise contemporary capitalism is afflicting. Xenophobic parties have been feeding on 
the sense of uncertainty globalization has been creating: anxiety based on perceptions of 
physical insecurity, political disorder, cultural estrangement, and employment insecurity Ð the 
key ingredients of a new order- and-security public agenda that emerged in the 1990s. 
The relational dimension of domination within this modality of capitalism concerns not 
so much income inequalities among social groups (or the 99% against the obscenely affluent 
1%), but rather the asymmetrical distribution of economic risks and opportunities that has taken 
place in the transformation of capitalism from its neoliberal modality of the 1980s and 1990s, to 
a new modality that emerged at the turn of the new century. Thus, a peculiarity of the new 
modality is the asymmetrical distribution of economic opportunity and risk among economic 
actors, triggered by the extreme marketization of the economy. In an (idealized) market society 
risks and opportunities are evenly mixed for every participant -- thus, in a liberal economy, 
capitalÕs opportunity for wealth-creation is offset by the investment risks it assumes. This 
correlation between opportunities and risks supplied much of the legitimation resource for both 
liberal (entrepreneurial) capitalism and its neo-liberal reincarnation. Recently, however, risks 
and opportunities have become disentangled and even polarized. Indeed, a plethora of recent 
studies have observed the emergence of ÔlosersÕ and ÔwinnersÕ (a new pracariat) among 
advanced industrial democracies as a result of globalization. Elsewhere, I have observed that 
risks and opportunities are asymmetrically allocated according to an actorÕs ability to benefit 
from the two vectors of globalization Ð open borders and information technology.40  Towards 
the turn of the century, specific policy measures (from deregulation to privileged tax regimes) 
allowed the aggregation of economic opportunities to particular economic actors and the 
aggregation of economic risk to others (note that this asymmetrical aggregation of opportunities 
and risks cuts across labor and capital and is often sector-specific). Significantly, the 
privatization of sectors of the economy that cannot be properly exposed to competition (such as 
energy infrastructure and rail transport) has given their owners the privileged status of rentiers Ð 
a status marked by reduced risk (due to low exposure to competition) and high earnings. Thus, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 A. Azmanova, ÒAfter the Left-Right (Dis)continuum: Globalization and the Remaking of EuropeÕs 
Ideological GeographyÓ, International Political Sociology 5/4 (2011), 384-407; p. 393. 
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risks and opportunities have become uncoupled in the current constellation.  
I will deviate from the narrative on the structural dynamics of contemporary capitalism 
to note that a feature of the emergent new modality of capitalism is that investment risk, as it is 
freed from its subordinate role to the real economy, becomes a fictitious commodity (next to 
land, labor, money and knowledge) Ð a product created exclusively for market exchange, but 
which by nature cannot be properly commodified (in this case because the market value of risk 
is to a great extent related to societal perceptions of risk). What we might call the 
Ôcommodification of riskÕ consists in the packaging of leveraged financial products and selling 
them as profit-creating goods Ð a situation in which the risk contained in the package is the 
primary entity generating profit.  The commodification of risk is most apparent in the case of 
credit default swaps (CDS) -- credit default swaps have existed since the early 1990s, but their 
use was rapidly increased between 2003 and 2007. In contrast to standard insurance, which 
one takes on a property one owns (a life, a house) CDS allow one to ensure what one does not 
own Ð namely the risk of someone elseÕs loan defaulting. In this context risk is not just an 
externality, but a product created for market exchange.  In line with the key legitimation 
principle of capitalism, investment risk (now purposefully created as a separate commodity), is 
rewarded with higher financial gains. However, since there is no proper competition in the 
sector of investment banking, the managers of investment risk are able to extract rent-like profit.   
 
b) the legitimacy matrix  
The semantics of state power have also altered. Let us recall that the institutional format of the 
liberal state under nineteenth-century entrepreneurial capitalism ensured the autonomy of the 
individual (constrained by labor commodification) in a modus we can call the Ôteen-age stateÕ. 
The trans-ideological consensus between European Socialism and European Conservatism on 
the need to safeguard society from the market forces (and re-establish the risk-opportunity 
correlation) supplied the political grammar of the post-WWII welfare state Ð the Ônanny state.Õ 
Later, Ôthe nannyÕ state of welfare capitalism was replaced by Ôthe stepmother stateÕ of the neo-
liberal 1980s and 1990s Ð a state that, far from idle, uses its legal authority and substantial 
administrative apparatus to enforce individual self-reliance.  
 As I noted, the context of intensified global economic integration of the late 1990s sets 
the stage for the next round of transformations. There is a positive correlation between 
international trade exposure and the size of public expenditure, which is unsurprising. As the 
state is allegedly unable to counter the domestic effect of global economic volatility, rather than 
engaging with social transfer systems, it is called on to offset the nebulous risks coming from 
global economic integration by the increased provision of general public services, especially on 
security and safety (e.g. increase of police force and surveillance technologies), or to invest in 
public buildings to increase revenue from tourism (e.g. Spain in the decade before the financial 
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collapse). Thus, although public expenditure continues to be substantial, the nature of 
intervention has changed: it is no longer about redistribution (from the affluent to the poor, via 
taxation) but through increased spending on general public services, through borrowing.  
!
The role of public authority has been further altered in recent years to allow it to 
actively manage the distribution of opportunities and risks via a new type of intervention: 
intervention aiming to lend support to economic actors who already have a competitive 
advantage in the global economy, for the sake of increasing the competitiveness of national 
economies. We all witnessed the massive bailout of failing banks, but also the special support 
states provided to specific companies (especially in the automotive industry) during the 
economic crisis. This aligns with a practice, preceding the crisis, of setting up so called Ônational 
championsÕ Ð private companies receiving large financial support from the state (often in 
defiance of EU competition rules), on the grounds that they are strategically important for the 
competitiveness of national economies.  Even before their bailout,   Ômega-banksÕ enjoyed lower 
funding costs not simply because of their economies of scale but due to a market perception 
that financial groups were guaranteed by the government. The entrenched practice of the state 
to absorb companiesÕ risk and pass it on to society has most recently produced the phenomenon 
of the ÔzombieÕ companies: during the post-2008 financial meltdown states placed ailing 
companies on life-support in the form of cheap bank loans backed by the government, which 
helped these companies refinance their old debt at much lower interest rates, thus saving them 
from bankruptcy. However, these companies spend all their revenue servicing debt rather than 
investing in growth and creating jobs. At the same time, the state is forcing society to absorb the 
risk thus generated by implementing austerity policies (cutting down spending on essential 
social services, as well as more generally public expenditure). This redistribution of funds from 
taxpayers to specific businesses or sectors of the economy amounts to salvaging capitalism by 
saving select (the most competitive) capitalists.  
 It is important to note that it is not only corporate capital that has profited from privileged 
treatment by the state; so have groups of workers. Illustrative of this development, for instance, 
was the manner in which the previous French government (under Nicolas Sarkozy as President) 
attempted to alleviate the social pain of the austerity measures it had introduced in early 2011.  
Alarmed by stagnating and dropping incomes (and a drop in purchasing power), the French 
government introduced in April 2011 a one-off payment of !1000 per salaried worker.  
However, the beneficiaries of this seemingly generous provision were select: only workers in the 
largest publicly listed corporations on the French stock-exchange (the CAC 40). Left out were 
those working in small and medium companies, public sector employers, and those on 
minimum wage (the so called smicards). The tendency for the state to help those who have a 
competitive advantage are exacerbated by the transformation from the ÔtaxingÕ to the 
ÔborrowingÕ state: The taxing state diminishes the disposable income of the well-to-do through 
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(progressive) taxation, while the borrowing state increases that income by paying interest on 
what the well-to-do can afford to loan the state.41  Thus, under Ôaggregative capitalismÕ the state 
has effectively renewed its redistributive function but directed it differently Ð not towards those 
most at risk of impoverishment (as in the times of welfare capitalism), but instead towards those 
in the best position to enhance the competitiveness of the national economy in the global 
market.   
 By force of these newly assumed redistributive functions of public authority that came 
into existence well before the economic crisis, we have entered into a new matrix of state-
society relations.  The overly-protective Ônanny stateÕ of post-war welfare capitalism, and the 
Ôstep-mother stateÕ of the neoliberal late twentieth century (a state which keeps its distance from 
society while disciplining it via investment in order and security), have been replaced by the 
Ôrich uncleÕ state Ð one that readily intervenes to help select actors for the sake of 
competitiveness in the global economy.  
To recap: In the liberal modality of capitalism public authority plays a market-
constitutive function; in the modality of organized capitalism it plays a compensatory function 
(using redistribution to offset social risk).  In the third, neoliberal form, the state lets the market 
assume more governing functions, including functions related to provision of social and national 
security). In the fourth modality, it actively intervenes to help privileged actors in order to 
enhance the global competitiveness of national economies.  Be it inadvertently, this amounts to 
playing an active role in social stratification by way of aggregating risks and opportunities for 
specific social groups, rather than distributing risks and opportunities evenly among citizens. 
Furthermore, as a result of the new distributional functions of the state, the polarization of life 
chances in the new context is no longer determined by class position (labor vs. capital or profit-
dependent versus wage-dependent groups), but by institutionalized access to security and 
opportunity that is sector-specific and even company-specific.42 This access is increasingly 
being managed via public intervention or implicit state guarantees of the sort discussed above. 
As a result, a new configuration of winners and losers has formed, beyond the traditional divide 
between capital and labor, and new capital-labor alliances are being formed according to 
particular economic sectorsÕ exposure to the risks and opportunities of the new economy of 
open borders and information technologies. 
 This in turn is forging a new ideological divide cutting across the left-right axis of 
ideological opposition that had been the basis of political competition throughout the twentieth 
century. I have described this new ideological and political division as one running between an 
ÔopportunityÕ and a ÔriskÕ pole of preference aggregation, depending on citizensÕ perceptions of 
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41 As discussed by Claus Offe in C. Offe, C., 2013. ÒEuropa in der FalleÓ, Eurozine - Bltter fr deutsche und 
internationale Politik 1/2013, 68-80. 
42 A. Azmanova, ÒThe Mobilisation of the European Left in the Early 21st Century,Ó European Journal of 
Sociology 45/2 (2004); pp. 273-306. 
!! 17!
the social effect of globalization. This entails not simply the dissolution of the left-right 
ideological divide (a tendency visible under ÔdisorganizedÕ capitalism), but its reconfiguration 
along new axis. A new precariat (those who perceive their livelihoods as threatened by 
globalization) mobilise behind extreme-left and far-right parties whose similar policy platforms 
form an ÒriskÓ pole. On the other side of the political spectrum emerges an ÒopportunityÓ pole 
as supporters of center-right, center-left, and green parties converge in their policy preferences 
aiming at reaping the benefits created, or just promised, by the new economy. 43 
How do these novel redistributive functions of the state under aggregative capitalism 
find their legitimation within the semantics of the social contract? I will address the matter of the 
renewed legitimation of democratic capitalism next.  
 
5. The lost legitimation crisis  
As I argued, legitimation of the social order is grounded on what publics perceive as what I 
called Ôpolitical deliverablesÕ Ð functions that people not only deem desirable, but also possible 
for public authority to perform. It is this matrix of legitimacy that has altered in such a way as to 
sustain capitalism in it new, ÔaggregativeÕ modality.  
 Since about the turn of the century, public authority (at all levels of governance) has 
undertaken ever more policy action to enhance market efficiency and intensify the production 
of wealth (including via regulations enabling the commodification of risk and the extension of 
rentierism), but less and less action to redistribute it. This has entailed a dramatic increase in 
social risk, while the responsibility for the generated risk has been diffused.  Rather than a 
retrenchment of the state, we have the new phenomenon of an increase in the power of 
governing bodies (and their capacity to inflict social harm), while their responsibility for the 
social consequences of policy action is decreasing. The key legitimating principle of capitalism 
Ð the correlation between risk and opportunity for wealth creation, has been violated. Yet there 
are no pressures on public authority to re-establish the balance. The discrepancy between 
power and responsibility should be eroding the authority of states, as Richard Sennett (2008) has 
claimed, and could be expected to trigger a legitimation crisis of the system of democratic 
capitalism.44 Yet, no such crisis ensues. This is the case because in the meantime, the legitimacy 
relationship between citizens and public authority has altered in such a way as to absolve the 
state from its primordial social responsibility of maintaining a correlation between risk and 
opportunity (one of the key legitimation resources of democratic capitalism). I turn now to the 
logic of this development.  
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43 Ibid., as well as A. Azmanova, ÒAfter the Left-Right(Dis)continuum: Globalization and the Remaking of 
EuropeÕs Ideological GeographyÓ, International Political Sociology 5/4 (2011), pp. 384-407. 
44 R. Sennett, The Culture of the New Capitalism. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006. 
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In the course of the institutionalized practices of individual responsibilization to which I 
referred above, the very legitimacy relationship between public authority and citizens (the 
legitimacy matrix) has been altered to exclude distributional issues from the range of political 
responsibility.  This is evidenced, for instance, in analyses establishing that globalization 
weakens the connection between the national economy and citizensÕ political choice  Ð 
economic openness reduces voter tendencies to hold incumbent policy makers responsible for 
economic performance and, by default, for the social consequences of economic policies.  Such 
absolution of the state from its social responsibility is asserted even via measures explicitly and 
deliberately intended to enhance social protection. Thus, the Council of EuropeÕs Charter on 
Shared Social Responsibilities that was proposed for public consultation in the spring of 2011 
and was recently adopted, justifies the novel concept of sharing responsibilities among various 
social actors with the assertion that states are, allegedly,  Ôless able to fulfil their role of ensuring 
access to social protectionÕ (as stated in its preamble). 
 Even more surprisingly, the absolution of public authority from social responsibility has 
been given enforced credence in the name of democracy Ð in the style of Ôdemocratization of 
everyday lifeÕ allegedly progressive forces advocate.  On the right, the call for more democracy 
tends to put the emphasis on society rather than on the state, and demands for democracy relate 
to communities assuming more social responsibilities, rather than to making the government 
more accountable to the people. A good example is the current UK governmentÕs 
experimentation with ÔBig SocietyÕ in which social problems are addressed through the 
extension of democracy, Ôempowering active and responsive citizenshipÕ, particularly in 
addressing environmental, social and health problems.  
 On the left,45 it has become fashionable to talk about shared social responsibility (an idea 
that emerged around the turn of the century, and found its most authoritative instantiation in the 
newly adopted Charter of the Council of Europe mentioned above). Not only is the left failing to 
mount an opposition and propose a macro alternative, but it is compounding the problem with 
positions that strangely echo a neoliberal discourse of anti-statism, thus further absolving 
political elites and public authority of obligations to rule in the public interest. Typical in this 
regard is the recent call of (self-identified) British radical left intellectuals for Òempowerment of 
everybodyÓ via the stateÕs Ògiving away power and resources directly to the peopleÓ.46 
There is no legitimacy crisis even in the thick of the economic meltdown in advanced 
liberal democracies because the very legitimacy relationship excludes issues of social safety.  
Public authority can cause social harm for which it does not assume responsibility since the 
very publics who are suffering the effects of economic policy have absolved public authority of 
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45 As David Harvey has put it, the radical left Òis nurtured intellectually by thinkers such as Michel Foucault 
and all those who have reassembled postmodern fragmentations under the banner of a largely incomprehensible post-
structuralism that favours identity politics and eschews class analysis.Ó (Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions, p?) 
46 The Guardian, March 23, 2014.  
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the responsibility for the social consequences of that policy. This deficiency of responsibility 
cannot be easily remedied with the tools of representative, participatory, or deliberative 
democracy, and even less so with those of fragmented resistance, devolution, and post-
structuralist ontologies of social empowerment.  
I suspect that democracy might be as much part of the problem as it is part of the 
solution: to the extent that democratic politics is a matter of an institutionally mediated 
expression of largely shared preferences, democratic politics takes place on the terrain of an 
existing legitimacy relationship between public authority and citizens. Whatever is not part of 
that relationship cannot be politicized and therefore cannot be challenged.  Therefore, if this 
relationship excludes social injustice and thus precludes the formulation of certain social 
grievances addressed to the political authority (or politicizes these grievances in the wrong 
direction via the short-cut of xenophobia), the common instruments of democratic politics are 
unlikely to be of much use.  And this is not a matter of Ôfalse consciousnessÕ. As Wolfgang 
Streeck writes, Ôexpectations in relation to which the political-economic system must legitimate 
itself exist not only among the population, but also on the side of capital-as-actorÓ.47 Moreover, 
since the rise of Ôshareholder democracyÕ in the late 20th century, a large section of the 
population is both wage-dependent and profit-dependent Ð be it only through the investment of 
oneÕs pension savings in the stock market. To the extent that the boundaries between the Ôprofit 
dependentÕ and Ôwage dependentÕ groups become thus blurred, everyoneÕs (immediate) welfare 
becomes dependent on the good economic health of capitalism, even when it can no longer 
ensure improving living standards.48  
A readjustment of the pathological legitimacy relationship between public authority and 
citizens would require that public authority again assume responsibility for the social effect of 
economic policy Ð but that would in turn require that the generalized dependency of practically 
everyoneÕs life on the productivist dynamics of globally integrated markets be eliminated.49 
Short of that, the brewing now revolt of the masses would be driven by an unpalatable 
combination between a fear of freedom and a resignation to the policy dogma Ôthere is no 
alternativeÕ (the fruit of which is the current rise of xenophobic parties and movements).50 
Indeed, if there is now a broadly shared trans-ideological consensus within our societies, it is 
that there is no alternative. It is from here that capitalism draws its excellent health. 
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 W. Streeck, Buying Time, p. 21 
48
 Until recently, profit-dependent and wage-dependent interests have been at locker heads: capital interests 
result from income dependence on return on invested capital and therefore owners or managers of capital seek to 
maximize the yield from the capital they have invested not least by repressing wages. Even as this in principle still 
remains the case, wage-dependent groups develop an interest in the stability and growth of financial markets either 
because this affects the availability of employment and therefore of livelihood, or because they have become themselves 
to some extent profit-dependent owners by owning stocks through their pension funds.  
49 It is not my purpose here to offer solutions to the problems I identify. I have adumbrated some such ideas 
elsewhere, in the terms of what IÕve called a Ôpolitical economy of trustÕ. See, for instance, my ÒAgainst the Politics of 
Fear: On Deliberation, Inclusion, and the Political Economy of TrustÓ, Philosophy and Social Criticism 37/2 (2011): 401-
412. Social Justice and Varieties of Capitalism: An Immanent CritiqueÓ,  New Political Economy 17/ 4 (2012): 445-463.  
50 Coined by Herbert Spencer, the phrase Ôthere is no alternativeÕ (abbreviated as TINA), was endorsed by 
Margaret Thatcher as a dictum intended to validate the neoliberal policy turn she undertook in the nineteen-eighties.   
!! 20!
 
6. Some concluding thoughts  
What we have experienced with the financial-turned-economic-turned-social crisis of the dawn 
of the new century is not a crisis of capitalism but a crisis for capitalism Ð roadblocks on the 
path of the competitive production of profit, which capitalism is already finding ways to 
overcome.  There is no crisis of capitalism at the nadir of its social and economic performance 
because capitalism has not lost its legitimacy; worst even -- it has managed to re-invert itself in 
the shape of what I described as ÔaggregativeÕ capitalism.   
I argued that capitalismÕs enduring legitimacy is largely due to the particular 
politicization that social grievances acquire.  The very social protests carry in them, unwittingly, 
a blessing for capitalism. As frustration is ever widely spreading, it takes the shape of grievances 
in effect confirming the legitimacy of capitalism. Complains about inequality (from the 
protestations of the 99% against the 1% to the astonishing popularity of Thomas PikettyÕs 
analysis that growing inequality is endemic to capitalism), and protestations against the policies 
of austerity in Europe, all imply a longing for relative equality in prosperity Ð for inclusion in the 
productivist mechanism of profit maximization that activates capitalism.51 Note that this 
particular politicization of the social evils of globally integrated capitalism (in the language of 
inclusion and equality) presents systemic injustice as relational injustice (that is, it disguises 
problems of the model of wellbeing as problems of oneÕs place within this model of wellbeing) 
52, and thus invites remedial policies (of redistribution) rather than radical reform of the Ôrules of 
the gameÕ. The most disturbing example of the wrong politicization of otherwise valid social 
grievances is the rise of xenophobia among disillusioned publics, and the mainstreaming of this 
xenophobia into the policy supplied by  (democratically elected) political elites across the left-
right ideological divide.  
 I wish I could say, adjusting that splendid opening phrase in PolanyiÕs The Great 
Transformation: ÒTwentieth century civilization has collapsedÓ. But I canÕt. As a university 
student in my native Bulgaria, I was one of those who made sure that the economic and social 
crises of communism (as a political regime) turned into its death sentence, as even those 
committed to the ideals of communism, like me, withdrew their allegiance to a morally 
bankrupt political regime and an exploitative socio-economic system. (Here a popular joke of 
the times springs to memory: ÒWhat is the difference between communism and capitalism? 
Under capitalism man exploits man; under communism it is the other way roundÓ). 
Communism is gone, and good riddance. But capitalism, fortified through surviving its latest 
crisis, is still with us. And it is a great shame. As two embodiments of the productivist logic of 
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 Contrast this with the upsurge of radical alternative lifestyles defying middle-class conventions in the 1960-
70s.  
52
 See footnote 18 and adjacent text.  
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technological modernity53, both capitalism and communism vanquish EnlightenmentÕs original 
promise for a life of individual autonomy and experimental self-realization.  
 
Well, the century has just begun.  
 
Albena Azmanova 
Berkeley, January 23, 2015  
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53 Here I willingly admit that I am much influenced by Vclav HavelÕs view on Modernity and its socio-
political incarnations. Havel believed that under communism as under capitalism, people are afflicted by a state he 
called samopohyb, which I translate as Ôself-wasteÕ, incurred by their submission to Òthe irrational momentum of 
anonymous, impersonal, and inhuman powerÑthe power of ideologies, systems, apparat, bureaucracy, artificial 
languages, and political slogans.Ó (See his 1984 essay ÒPolitics and ConscienceÓ). !!
 
